My research philosophy centers on adaptive jurisprudence, examining how legal frameworks must evolve to meet the fluid demands of digital innovation, economic integration, and social justice without compromising the stability of the rule of law.
In this article, we critically examine how existing international arbitration and specifically investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) may be misaligned with African values and legal culture and proposes the African concept of Ubuntu as a philosophical and procedural foundation to reform norms of arbitration. Using benchmark cases such as Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania, Von Pezold v. Zimbabwe, Glamis Gold v. USA, Bear Creek Mining v. Peru, Urbaser v. Argentina, and Cortec Mining v. Kenya, we show how mainstream arbitration has disempowered community stakeholders and ignored community interests. We then delineate Ubuntu, the African philosophy of relational personhood which incorporates respect for individual dignity, communality and harmony, and make a case for its incorporation into arbitration as a foundational concept in line with "fundamental notions of justice and equity". Procedural innovations are proposed that embrace community and non-disputing party participation, fostering transparency, and streamlining procedures to align with the values within Ubuntu. We highlight the wider consequences of an "Ubuntu-inspired" approach on sustainability, human rights, and development outcomes, drawing on contemporary legal instruments and the new AAA Model BIT. Our conclusion offers concrete policy recommendations including the insertion of Ubuntu into African and Afrocentric global treaty documents, the impact of indigenous participation and socio-environmental issues in ISDS, and the integration of African legal values into the international rules of arbitral practice where there is direct effect upon the nations of the African Continent.
The International Criminal Court (ICC), established by the Rome Statute, 1 represents a significant advancement in the pursuit of international justice. The Rome Statute, adopted in 1998 and entering into force in 2002, serves as the foundational document for the ICC, delineating its jurisdiction, structure, and core principles. Central to the ICC's mandate is the doctrine of irrelevance of official capacity, enshrined in Article 27 of the Rome Statute, which asserts that an individual's official position, does not exempt them from criminal responsibility under the court's jurisdiction. However, the ICC's jurisdiction is not without its complexities. Article 98 of the Statute introduces a potential counterbalance to Article 27, recognizing states' obligations under international law regarding diplomatic immunities and the surrender of individuals to the court. This apparent contradiction between Articles 27 and 98 has given rise to significant legal and diplomatic challenges, exposing tensions between the pursuit of international justice and the preservation of sovereign prerogatives. Against this background, this article attempts to examine the intricate relationship between Articles 27 and 98 of the Rome Statute, exploring the legal, theoretical, and practical implications of their coexistence.
This article examines the jurisprudence surrounding the extension of time to challenge arbitral awards under the 1996 English Arbitration Act. It focuses on the English Commercial Court's decision in P&ID v. Nigeria, which extended the time limit to challenge an award from 28 days to over 3 years. The article reviews key English court decisions on extending time limits and analyzes the criteria courts consider, such as length of delay, conduct of the parties, and overall fairness. It argues the jurisprudence has evolved to focus more on achieving justice rather than strictly applying statutory time limits. The article concludes courts should grant extensions when in the interests of justice, even for long delays, if an award has not yet been enforced.
I am actively exploring research collaborations and academic dialogue in the areas of: